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CRYPTOLA W FOR 
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGIES: 
A JURISPRUDENTIAL FRAMEWORK 
Carla L. Reyes• 
ABSTRACT: Both governments and private entities increasingly tum to distributed 
ledger technologies (DL T) for more efficient and transparent ways to implement admin-
istrative and other processes. When so doing requires grafting legal concepts onto com-
puter code, changes will ripple outward to affect other areas of the law. Treating DLT as 
a foreign legal system allows comparative law to illuminate five areas of jurisprudential 
disruption from moving legal processes to DLT-based systems: substantive legal 
changes, new regulatory actors, legal structure changes, law-lag reduction, and legal cul-
ture changes. This article explores such ripple effects in the context of DLT-based cor-
porate share registries in Delaware. The article argues that, in addition to changes to the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, DL T-based share registries may impact corporate 
law in other substantive ways, see the rise of new regulator-like entities, and magnify the 
shift in corporate culture reflected in the unicorn and platform technology company phe-
nomena. 
CITATION: Carla L. Reyes, Cryptolaw for Distributed Ledger Technologies: A 
Jurisprudential Framework, 58 JURIMETRICS J. 283-302 (2018). 
In July 2017, Delaware Governor John C. Carney Jr. signed into law 
amendments to the Delaware General Coiporation Law that allow corporations 
to issue shares through blockchain technologies. 1 Meanwhile, the governments 
of Sweden2 and Cook County, Illinois have investigated the possibility of im-
plementing a real-property recording system through blockchain technology. 3 
*Carla L. Reyes is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at Stetson University College of Law 
and a Faculty Associate at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University. 
A substantial portion of this article is derived from an article in the Nebraska Law Review. See Carla 
L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384 (2017). 
1. Pete Rizzo, Delaware Governor Signs Blockchain Bill into Law, COINDESK (July 24, 2017, 
1:30 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/delaware-govemor-signs-blockchain-legislation-law [https:// 
perma.cc/2DHN-BDYP]. 
2. Pete Rizzo, Sweden Tests Blockchain Smart Contracts for Land Registry, COINDESK (June 16, 
2016, 3:55 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/sweden-blockchain-smart-contracts-land-registry [https: 
//perma.cc/2Z9K-R WLK]. 
3. JOHN MIRKOVIC, COOK CTY. RECORDER OF DEEDS, BLOCK CHAIN PILOT PROGRAM: FINAL 
REPORT 21-22 (2017), http://cookrecorder.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Final-Report-CCRD-
Blockchain-Pilot-Program-for-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG77-S8WK]; Rizzo, supra note 2. 
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More ambitiously, Dubai seeks to move all govermuent documents to block-
chain-based systems by the year 2020. 4 The Department of Homeland Security 
and the Illinois Blockchain Initiative each demonstrate interest in the potential 
of self-sovereign identity solutions through a distributed ledger technology 
called Sovrin. 5 Although technology frequently spurs innovation in law and 
governance, the use ofblockchain and distributed ledger technologies to do so 
introduces qualitatively different challenges, implications, and consequences. 
When govermuents and regulators use blockchain technology or distributed 
ledger technology to implement and deliver law "through smart-contracting, 
semi-autonomous, cryptographic computer code," they create "crypto-legal 
structures."6 This article predicts that enabling the use of crypto-legal structures 
through amendments to Delaware's General Corporate Law will have ripple ef-
fects in the law. Namely, using crypto-legal structures will impact the way law-
makers, lawyers, and everyday citizens think about law, and may alter the actual 
substantive rules that apply in certain circumstances. In prior work, I developed 
a framework for analyzing the use of crypto-legal structures, which I call "cryp-
tolaw."7 The intent of the cryptolaw framework for blockchain technologies is 
to create a jurisprudential space, which anticipates the nature of the ripple effects 
that crypto-legal structures will ignite. This article uses Delaware's efforts to 
allow the issuance ofblockchain-based corporate shares to illustrate how engag-
ing in a cryptolaw analysis creates a new jurisprudential discourse. To do so, the 
article first briefly introduces distributed ledger technology. The article then ex-
amines the considerations to use when evaluating whether to adopt a crypto-
legal structure. Next, the article explores the six ripple effects that the cryptolaw 
analytical framework expects to result from adopting crypto-legal structures in 
the context of Delaware's blockchain-based corporate share innovations. The 
article concludes by predicting the next wave of corporate legal issues ignited 
by Delaware's current activity and highlighting areas in need of further research. 
4. Michael del Castillo, Dubai Wants All Government Documents on Blockchain by 2020, 
COINDESK (Oct. 5, 2016, 4:40 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/dubai-government-documents-
blockchain-strategy-2020/ [https://perma.cc/2N6A-E3UG]. 
5. Jason Bloomberg, Can Blockchain Solve the Equifax Identity Morass? Here's How, FORBES 
(Oct. 6, 2017, 2: 16 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/2017 /10/06/can-blockchain-
solve-the-equifax-identity-morass-heres-how/#56fd3859296a [https://perma.cc/8ZNG-NTGX]. 
6. Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384, 387 (2017). I first coined 
the term "crypto-legal structures" and introduced the idea of cryptolaw as an emerging jurisprudence 
for the use of distributed ledger technologies in legal processes in Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, from 
which this article is derived. Id. at 389. I note that although the focus in both this article and in 
Conceptualizing Cryptolaw is the adoption of crypto-legal structures by government actors, the idea 
of crypto-legal structure is broad enough to capture any time a societal actor chooses to implement 
an arrangement recoguized in law through computer code (such as business entities). Id. at 387. 
7. Id. at 389. 
284 58 JURIMETRICS 
Cryptolaw for Blockchain Technologies 
I. A DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY PRIMER 
Books can be, and have been, written to explain how the various implemen-
tations of distributed ledger and blockchain technology work. 8 That kind of de-
tailed treatment of the technical elements of this technology lies beyond the 
scope of this short article. Nevertheless, to enable an in-depth discussion of the 
implications of crypto-legal structures for adjacent areas of the law, this article 
begins with a (very) brief introduction to distributed ledger technology, block-
chain technology, and smart contracts. The focus ofthis section is to highlight 
the key elements of the technology that drive the need for the cryptolaw juris-
prudential framework. 
A. Distributed Ledger and Blockchain Technology 
This article uses the term distributed ledger technology (DL T) to refer gen-
erally to "computer software that is distributed, runs on peer-to-peer networks, 
and offers a transparent, verifiable, tamper-resistant transaction-management 
system maintained through a consensus mechanism rather than by a trusted 
third-party intermediary that guarantees execution."9 DLT is an umbrella term 
used to refer to any number of technical variations of systems that achieve these 
functions, 10 while blockchain technology is the term used to refer to a specific 
subset of distributed ledgers. 11 As Garrick Hileman and Michel Rauchs state: 
In general, the term "distributed ledger technology" refers to all initiatives and 
projects that are building systems to enable the shared control over the evolu-
tion of data without a central party, with individual systems referred to as "dis-
tributed ledgers." If one wants to describe a system that has global data 
8. See, e.g., ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN: PROGRAMMING THE OPEN 
BLOCKCHAIN (2d ed. 2017); ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY 
TECHNOLOGY: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (2016). 
9. Id. at 390-91 (citations omitted). Because I have previously written detailed explanations 
of how DLT works-see id. at 389-96 and Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an 
Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. 
L. REV. 191, 196-202 (2016)-this DLT primer is particularly brief. 
10. GARRICK HILEMAN & MICHEL RAUCHS, CAMBRIDGE CTR. FOR ALT. FIN., GLOBAL 
BLOCK CHAIN BENCHMARKING STUDY 21-22 (2017) ("The first blockchains were closely based on 
the architecture ofBitcoin, where transactions sent across the system are bundled into a new 'block.' 
This new block references the preceding block, effectively forming a chain of cryptographically 
linked transaction bundles. New database systems have emerged that are also often referred to as 
blockchains, but which do not share the main characteristics of 'traditional' blockchains used by 
cryptocurrencies. For instance, some are 'block-less' ... others do not broadcast all transactions to 
each participant, and yet others do not reach consensus on the state of the global ledger but rather 
on the state of sub-ledgers or channels .... The development of these new types of systems, loosely 
built on the original Bitcoin blockchain concept, has resulted in the emergence of a new, more ge-
neric term-distributed ledger technology (DLT) ."). 
11. Id. at 24 ("Blockchains can be thought of as a special subset of distributed ledgers that 
share the same adversarial threat model, but have additional characteristics that set them apart."). 
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diffusion and/or uses a data structure of chained blocks, one should call it a 
"blockchain."12 
Essentially, any specific distributed ledger or blockchain operates as a com-
puter protocol that sets the rules allowing networked computers to communicate 
with each other to reach agreement over the evolution and existence of shared 
facts and shared data. 13 Many distributed ledgers and blockchains (but not all) 
"are also robust enough to allow software developers to layer complex relation-
ships into the computational material of the underlying protocol." 14 Such com-
plex relationships are often built by computer programs referred to colloquially 
as "smart contracts." 15 
B. Smart Contracts 
The term smart contract is widely used, and often misused. In particular, 
many people, and particularly those trained in legal studies, associate the term 
"smart contract" with the concept of a legal contract, including the contractual 
issues of offer, acceptance, and consideration. 16 Although smart contracts may, 
in fact, be written in ways that amount to a legal contract, 17 at a basic level, the 
term smart contract is routinely used to refer only to "a computer protocol-an 
algorithm-that can self-execute, self-enforce, self-verify, and self-constrain 
the performance" of its instructions. 18 Indeed, in reality, software developers use 
different terms to refer to the same functionality-Ethereum developers use the 
term smart contract while bitcoin developers use the term script. 19 Smart con-
tracts (or scripts), quite simply, "are computer programs that can automatically 
12. Id. As in my prior work, this article adopts the terminology confirmed as best practice by 
Hileman and Rauchs-using the umbrella term DLT to refer to the technology in general and block-
chain when referring to a specific distributed ledger that exhibits one or more of the characteristics 
unique to that subset of DL T. Id. 
13. Richard Gendal Brown, Introducing R3 Corda™: A Distributed Ledger Designed for 
Financial Services, R3: POV BLOG (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.r3.com/blog/2016/04/05/introducing-
r3-corda-a-distributed-ledger-designed-for-financial-services/ [https ://perma. cc/GX 4 X-4 PHN] (de-
scribing DL T as "platforms, shared across the Internet between mutually distrusting actors, that 
allow them to reach consensus about the existence and evolution of facts shared between them"); 
Peter Van Valkenburgh, What is "Blockchain" Anyway?, COINCENlER (Apr. 25, 2017), 
www.coincenter.org/entry/what-is-blockchain-anyway [https://perma.cc/2FU5-7T8Y]. 
14. Reyes, supra note 6, at 396. 
15. See id. 
16. Contra HILEMAN & RAUCHS, supra note 10, at 57 ("Contrary to their name, smart 
contracts are neither extremely smart nor contracts (in the legal sense)."). 
17. See R3 & NORTON ROSE FuLBRIGHT, CAN SMART CONTRACTS BE LEGALLY BINDING 
CONTRACTS? (2016), http://www.nortonro sefulbright. com/files/norton -rose-fulbright --r3-smart -con 
tracts-white-paper-key-fmdings-nov-2016-144554 .pdf [https://perma.cc/W7GT-LSJG]; Kevin Werbach 
& Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 338-343 (2017). 
18. TIM SWANSON, GREAT CHAIN OF NUMBERS: A GUIDE TO SMART CONTRACTS, SMART 
PROPERTY, AND TRUSTLESS ASSET MANAGEMENT 16 (2014); see MELANIE SWAN, BLOCKCHAIN: 
BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW ECONOMY 16 (Tim McGovern ed., 2015) ("[A] smart contract is both de-
fined by the code and executed (or enforced) by the code, automatically without discretion."). 
19. See, e.g., ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 8, at 155-166 (describing the various forms of 
scripts that can be constructed using the Bitcoin Blockchain, many of which would be called a 
"smart contract" in Ethereum). 
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perform some function" upon the fulfillment of certain predetermined condi-
tion(s).20 As such, smart contracts might be better described as "verifiable 
scripts. "21 
The concept of a smart contract is not new. In traditional database architec-
tures, smart contracts are called "stored procedures."22 As Hileman and Rauchs 
explain: "The key difference of running them in a distributed ledger is that the 
execution of smart contracts is guaranteed by system rules and the outcome is 
verifiable and auditable by all network participants."23 Thus, the key elements 
that make these verifiable scripts both unique and powerful "lie in their autono-
mous, self-sufficient, distributed nature." 24 Current uses of verifiable scripts in 
the private sector include the securities-trading platform developed and 
launched by Overstock.com Inc.-the tO platform, 25 decentralized file storage, 26 
and decentralized notary services, 27 among others. 28 
20. HILEMAN & RAUCHS, supra note 10, at 57. 
21. This is the term adopted by the Coalition of Automated Legal Applications working group 
members at its recent meeting at Stetson University College of Law on October 28-29, 2017 (in 
addition to the author, the following members of the working group were in attendance: Assistant 
Professor of Law Paolo Saguato, Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University; Ms. 
Wendy Lawson, Director Advisory Services at the International Association for Contract & Com-
mercial Management; Mr. Christopher Cervellera, Juris Doctor, Stetson University College of Law; 
Mr. Dan Virgil Puscasiu, Ph.D. Candidate, University of Milan; Ms. Primavera de Filippi, Faculty 
Associate, Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, and Ms. Constance 
Choi, Founder, Seven Advisory). The COALA working group members strongly encourage others 
to adopt this term as a more precisely descriptive term than the confusion-causing term "smart con-
tract." 
22. HILEMAN & RAUCHS, supra note 10, at 57. 
23.Id. 
24. Reyes, supra note 6, at 398. 
25. David Floyd, Overstock's tO: Reconciling Fiat Currency and the Bitcoin Blockchain, 
NASDAQ (Dec. 16, 2015, 1:30 PM), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/overstocks-t0-reconciling-fiat-
currency-and-the-bitcoin-blockchain-cm555617 [https://perma.cc/Q2ZS-7 AAF] ("Overstock.com Inc . 
. . . has issued bonds on the bitcoin blockchain, becoming the first company to offer a crypto-
security, and has gained regulatory approval to do the same with equity."). 
26. Shawn Wilkinson, Storj: A Peer-to-Peer Cloud Storage Network 2 (Dec. 15, 2014) (un-
published manuscript) (outlining a proposal for a "decentralized cloud storage platform that imple-
ments end-to-end encryption on a decentralized and open network"), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/ 
viewdoc/download?doi=10.l.l.693.785&rep=repl&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/U57P-SQDR]. 
27. Luke Parker, Bitnation Starts Offering Blockchain Public Notary Service to Estonian e-
Residents, BRAVENEWCOIN (Dec. 1, 2015), http://bravenewcoin.com/news/bitnation-starts-offering-
blockchain-public-notary-service-to-estonian-e-residents [https://perma.cc/M5ZF-PBAB]. 
28. For a more complete discussion of potential and developing use cases, see for example, J. 
DAX HANSEN & CARLA L. REYES, PERKINS COIE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SMART CONTRACT 
APPLICATIONS: DIGITAL ASSET SALES AND CAPITAL MARKETS, SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT, 
LAND REGISlRIES, GoVERNMENT RECORDS AND SMART CITIES, AND SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY 
(2017), https://www.virtnalcurrencyreport.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2017 /05/Petkins-Coie-LLP-
Legal-Aspects-of-Smart-Contracts-Applications.pdf [https://perma.cc/ A6TQ-UNQG] and SMART 
CONTRACTS ALL. WITH DELOITTE, SMART CONTRACTS: 12 USE CASES FOR BUSINESS & BEYOND 
(2016), https://digitalchamber.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Smart-Contracts-12-U se-Cases-for-
Business-and-Beyond _Chamber-of-Digital-Commerce. pdf [https://perma.cc/V 4 AN-SNBE]. 
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Increasingly, the public sector is also indicating interest in potential appli-
cations of verifiable scripts and distributed ledger technology for use in govern-
ment and legal processes. 29 Such contemplated uses call for the law and those 
that develop it-academics, practitioners and lawmakers alike-to prepare for 
a time when verifiable scripts and distributed ledger technology disrupt the law 
itself. In other words, public sector implementation or other enabling of verifi-
able scripts and distributed ledger technology calls for engagement with a cryp-
tolaw jurisprudential framework for blockchain technology and distributed 
ledger technology. 
II. RECENT ADOPTION OF 
CRYPTO-LEGALSTRUCTURESAND 
THE NEED FOR CRYPTOLA W JURISPRUDENCE 
According to Black's Law Dictionary, in "the proper sense of the word," 
jurisprudence 
is the science oflaw, namely, that science which has for its function to ascertain 
the principles on which legal rules are based, so as not only to classify those 
rules in their proper order, and show the relation in which they stand to one 
another, but also to settle the manner in which new or doubtful cases should be 
brought under the appropriate rules. 30 
Cryptolaw, then, is the science of ascertaining the principles applicable when 
societal actors (whether governmental or private) adopt crypto-legal structures 
in two specific contexts: first, in identifying when adoption of a crypto-legal 
structure is actually warranted, and second, in determining how and in what 
manner we should assess the applicability of existing rules and the relation of 
existing rules to crypto-legal structures. This section sets forth the key elements 
of each of these pieces of cryptolaw for DLT. 
A. Help or Hype: When is a Crypto-Legal Structure 
Actually Warranted? 
Current public sector DLT applications under active investigation include 
real property registries, 31 government archives and record retention, 32 UCC-1 
29. MARK WHITE ET AL., WILL BLOCKCHAIN TRANSFORM THE PuBLIC SECTOR? 2 (2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/ content/dam/insights/us/articles/4185 _ blockchain-public-sector/DUP _ 
will-blockchain-transform-public-sector.pdf; see also infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text. 
30. Jurisprudence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1992). 
31. See MIRKOVIC, supra note 3; Rizzo, supra note 2. 
32. E.g., Del Castillo, supra note 4; Andrea Tinianow & Caitlin Long, Delaware Blockchain 
Initiative: Transforming the Foundational Infrastructure of Corporate Finance, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 16, 2017), https://cotpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/16/ 
delaware-blockchain-initiative-transforming-the-foundational-infrastructure-of-corporate-finance/ 
[https://perma.cc/L6SP-7X37] ("The first milestone on [the Delaware Blockchain Initiative's] 
roadmap has been reached. It is the rollout of distributed ledger technology at the Delaware Public 
Archives, which has been the 'beta' test for the technology within State govermnent. New 'smart 
records' technology automates compliance with laws pertaining to retention and destruction of ar-
chival documents, among other features."). 
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filings for secured lending transactions under UCC Article 9, 33 anti-money laun-
dering regulation compliance;34 issuance and maintenance of identity docu-
ments,35 protection of health data, 36 compliance with evidentiary standards,37 
and allowing the issuance of corporate shares on DL T-based systems, 38 among 
others. The variety and breadth of the subjects represented in this list make it 
tempting to assume that DL T applications really represent more efficient and 
secure database, cloud, or cryptography-based applications technologies.39 
Hence, there appears to be a certain rush to "upgrade" existing database struc-
tures to DLT-based systems. 40 However, leading technologists agree that the 
cost of using large networks of computers to reach distributed or decentralized 
consensus about the existence and evolution of shared facts exceeds the benefits 
ofDLT in scenarios where existing databases work well. 41 Many commentators 
33. Tinianow & Long, supra note 32 ("The second milestone will be 'smart UCC' filings .. 
UCC filings on a distributed ledger will (1) automate the release or renewal of UCC filings and 
related collateral, (2) increase the speed of searching UCC records, (3) reduce mistakes and fraud 
and (4) cut cost."). 
34. See HENNING DIEDRICH, EIBEREUM: BLOCKCHAINS, DIGITAL ASSETS, SMART 
CONTRACTS, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONS 19 (2016) (noting the European Un-
ion's research into blockchain-based anti-money laundering regulation compliance systems). 
35. See CRAIG HOLLOWAY, DEP'T OF INNOVATION & TECH., STATE OF ILLINOIS: REQUEST 
FOR INFORMATION (RFI): DISTRIBUTED LEDGER AND BLOCKCHAIN APPLICATIONS IN IBE PuBLIC 
SECTOR 4-5 (2016), https://www2.illinois.gov /sites/doit/Documents/Blockchainlnitiative/RFI+ 
Blockchain+and+Distributed+Ledger+Applications+in+the+Public+Sector.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7 
VC-Z32Q] (naming identity, attestation and ownership registries as one of the public-sector appli-
cations slated for further investigation); Bloomberg, supra note 5. 
36. See Joseph Bradley, U.S. Department of Health Calls for Blockchain Research, CCN (July 
8, 2016, 10: 11 AM), https://www.ciyptocoinsnews.com/u-s-department-of-health-calls-for-block 
chain-white-papers [https://perma.cc/MH2T-R3LH]. 
37. See Joaillla Diane Caytas, Blockchain in the U.S. Regulatory Setting: Evidentiary Use in 
Vermont, Delaware, and Elsewhere, COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. (May 30, 2017), http://stlr.org/ 
20 17 /0 5/30/b lockchain-in-the-u-s-regulatoiy-setting-evidentiaiy-use-in-vermont -delaware-and-else 
where/ (noting that Vermont enacted legislation "on recognizing validity of blockchain records and 
their admissibility in courts as evidence without need for authentication," and Nevada also enacted 
legislation providing "for recognition of validity of blockchain records, blockchain-enabled elec-
tronic signatures, and smart contracts"). 
38. Tinianow & Long, supra note 32 ("When then-Governor Markell launched the [Delaware 
Blockchain Initiative], he committed State government to use the technology and asked the Dela-
ware State Bar Association's Corporation Law Council to consider clarifying Delaware corporate 
law to expressly authorize tracking of share issuances and transfers on a distributed ledger."). 
3 9. DIEDRICH, supra note 34, at 49-50 (demonstrating that many current proposals for block-
chain-based applications are really database, cloud-service, or ciyptography-based applications in-
stead). 
40. See, e.g., Aillla Irrera & John McCrank, Wall Street Rethinks Blockchain Projects as 
Euphoria Meets Reality, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2018, 9:58 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
alphabet-google-ads-exclusive/exclusive-google-unveils-vetting-process-for-drug-rehab-ads-idUSKB 
NlHN28X [https://perma.cc/ZU5A-37L6]. 
41. Nolan Bauerle, What is the Difference Between a Blockchain and a Database?, 
COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-the-difference-blockchain-and-database/ 
[https://perma.cc/25AS-QQAL] ("[I]f confidentiality is the only goal, and trust is not an issue, 
blockchain databases pose no advantage over a centralized database. Hiding information on a block-
chain requires lots of ciyptography and a related computational burden for the nodes in the network. 
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nevertheless argue that public sector DL T applications offer opportunities to in-
crease efficiency and transparency, enhance security of government systems, 
and establish trustable audit trails. 42 How, then, can scenarios where crypto-
legal structures will actually help be separated from the hype? We start by build-
ing a jurisprudence of cryptolaw. 
Professor Lawrence Lessig famously wrote "[c]ode is law," to emphasize 
that "we must understand how ... the software and hardware that make cyber-
space what it is regulate cyberspace as it is." 43 In other words, code, as the ar-
chitecture of the Internet, constrains the ability of Internet users to take action 
via technological means. 44 Building on this idea of"code is law," DLT code can 
be conceptualized as a foreign legal system for the purpose of creating analytical 
space for determining whether-and under which circumstances-the creation 
of a crypto-legal structure is warranted. 45 Comparative law, or comparative ju-
risprudence, described as the study of the principles of law by comparing legal 
systems, 46 uses the functional method to "consider[] elements of a legal system 
in light of the function that it serves in responding to a societal problem. "47 In 
so doing, comparative law recognizes legal systems as subsystems of a larger 
cultural system. 48 As such, the comparative functional method employs a meth-
odology that requires researchers comparing one legal system to another system 
to ask whether, in the absence of an equivalent legal structure, some other insti-
tution, legal or non-legal, fills the same function. 49 To determine whether a 
crypto-legal structure is warranted, and upon which DLT architecture such a 
crypto-legal structure should be based, we use the comparative functional 
method to ascertain: (1) the function of the distributed ledger, and (2) the func-
tions of the components that make-up its architecture. 
There is no way to do this that is more effective than simply hiding the data completely in a private 
database that does not even require network connectivity."). 
42. See, e.g., Darcie Piechowski, Blockchain for Government, IBM CTR. FOR Bus. Gov'T 
(Mar. 27, 2017, 6:45 AM), http://www.businessofgovermnent.org/blog/business-govermnent/ 
blockchain-govermnent-0 [https://perma.cc/C2PL-P7NP]; Samantha Radocchia, What Are Some 
Ways Blockchain Smart Contracts Can Improve Government?, QUORA (Nov. 9, 2017), https:// 
www.quora.com/What-are-some-ways-blockchain-smart-contracts-can-improve-govermnent/answer/ 
Samantha-Radocchia [https://perma.cc/74ZK-7YDB]. 
43. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999) (emphasis omitted). 
44. Primavera De Filippi & Samer Hassan, Blockchain Technology as a Regulatory 
Technology: From Code Is Law to Law Is Code, 21 FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 5, 2016), http://first 
monday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/7113/5657 [https://perma.cc/6B6C-DUQ7] ("[C]ode is 
ultimately the architecture of the Internet, and-as such-is capable of constraining an individual's 
actions via technological means."). 
45. Reyes, supra note 6, at 415. 
46. Comparative Law, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1992). 
4 7. Reyes, supra note 6, at 416 (citing Ralf Michaels, The Functionalism of Legal Origins, in 
DOES LAW MATTER? ON LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 21, 23 (Michael Faure & Jan Smits eds., 
2011)). 
48. See id. (citing Tom Ginsburg, Lawrence M Friedman's Comparative Law, with Notes on 
Japan, 5 J. COMP. L. 92, 102 (2010)). 
49. Id. (citing Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing 
Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 765, 778 
(2009)). 
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The first issue, the function of a distributed ledger, is not difficult to ascer-
tain, as the very definition of DL T conveys its function: allowing mutually dis-
trusting actors to reach consensus on the evolution and existence of shared 
facts. 50 Viewed in the light of its function, DL T-based systems offer a cost-
justified solution to implementation or enforcement of a legal or regulatory pro-
cess in the public sector when the problem in the existing system relates to the 
relative inability of multiple parties to reach a consensus about the existence and 
evolution of shared facts. 51 The second issue will be viewed differently by dif-
ferent actors in the D LT ecosystem, 52 but many coders, such as R3 's Richard 
Gendal Brown view the ultimate function of D LT as being achieved by a "bun-
dle of five services (consensus, validity, uniqueness, immutability, and authen-
tication) that can be selected, like items on a menu, in whatever combination is 
needed to address a problem."53 Thus, determining which DLT or blockchain 
architecture is best suited for the basis of a crypto-legal structure will depend 
upon the unique combination of these five services and the effect on the function 
of the bundled service caused by the design trade-offs made in selecting that 
combination. 
According to Brown, the first of the five bundled services offered through 
DL T is consensus, which he defines as "creat[ing] a world where parties to a 
shared fact know that the fact they see is the same as the fact that other stake-
holders see .... across the Internet between mutually untrusting parties."54 By 
providing the second service, validity, DLT has the capacity "to know whether 
a given proposed update to the system is valid." 55 DLT also enables uniqueness, 
"the capacity, in the face of conflicting valid updates to the system, 'to know 
which, if either, of those updates we should select as the one we all agree on. "'56 
As I stressed in an earlier article: "Immutability [is] the feature ofDL T whereby 
'nobody else [in the DLT system] will accept a transaction from me if it tries to 
build on a modified version of some data that has already been accepted by other 
stakeholders. "'57 And finally, by performing the service of authentication, DLT 
enables "every action in the system [to be] almost always associated with a pri-
50. Brown, supra note 13 (defining DLT as "platforms, shared across the Internet between 
mutually distmsting actors, that allow them to reach consensus about the existence and evolution of 
facts shared between them"). 
51. Reyes, supra note 6, at 402. 
52. Indeed, there are debates on just about everything relating to architecture and design of 
DLT and blockchain-based systems. 
53. Reyes, supra note 6, at 401 (citing Brown, supra note 13). 
54. Brown, supra note 13. 
55. Id. 
56. Reyes, supra note 6, at 395 (quoting Brown, supra note 13). 
57. Id. (quoting Brown, supra note 13). Note here that "immutability" really amounts to 
tamper-resistance. Id. at 395 n.64. It is a short hand term used to denote that it is extremely difficult 
for one user, acting alone, to change the agreed upon state of shared facts between participants. Id. 
It does not literally mean "never able to change." 
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vate key; [such that] there is no concept of a 'master key' or' administrator pass-
word' that gives God-like powers." 58 When creating a crypto-legal structure, if 
the emphasis is on tamper-resistance, then the crypto-legal structure should be 
built using a distributed ledger that emphasizes what Brown calls the service of 
"immutability."59 If, instead, the key function to be achieved is authentication, 
then the crypto-legal structure should be built on a distributed ledger that em-
phasizes that service. 
For example, Brown's own Corda platform limits the consensus service to 
only those parties (in Corda's case, regulated financial institutions) that need to 
agree on particular shared data. 6° Corda offers a distributed ledger for financial 
institutions engaged in deals with each other.61 The idea is that only the parties 
to those deals need to see the shared data about the transactions. 62 A similar 
approach is taken to validity in Corda' s design, where Corda allows participants 
themselves to choose the level of the uniqueness service offered by DLT to suit 
the particular deal at hand. 63 The final services of very strong tamper-resistance 
(immutability) and authentication, on the other hand, resemble very closely the 
features of the original Bitcoin blockchain.64 Ultimately, then, treating DLT as 
a foreign legal system offers a conceptual framework for determining whether 
a crypto-legal structure may be an appropriate tool for implementing and en-
forcing a legal process and what type of distributed ledger should be used as the 
basis for that crypto-legal structure. 
B. Crypto-Legal Structures Operate Like Legal Transplants, 
Anticipating Five Areas of Jurisprudential Ripple Effects 
Treating the code that comprises DL T protocols as a foreign legal system 
also creates a launching pad for exploring the broader jurisprudential implica -
tions of creating and adopting crypto-legal structures. It should be noted that 
"[i]fDLT is approached as a form of foreign law, the creation of a crypto-legal 
structure by taking an existing legal rule and rewriting it into computer code 
should be approached as an exercise in legal transplantation."65 In the compar-
ative legal literature on legal transplants, a legal transplant occurs when a legal 
rule, institution, or structure in one system is copied and implemented in a for-
eign system. 66 The extensive comparative legal literature discussing legal trans-
plants67 also teaches how to expect legal transplants to behave and how to decide 
58. Brown, supra note 13. 
59.Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63.Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Reyes, supra note 6, at 415. 
66. Id. 
67. For further discussion of the debate and literature on legal transplants in comparative law, 
see, for example, id. at 421-22 (citing ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO 
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what the transplant should look like. 68 These lessons from comparative law 
translate into five areas of jurisprudential ripple effects that should be expected 
to emerge as governments adopt crypto-legal structures to implement and en-
force law. 69 
First, as crypto-legal structures are adopted to enforce or implement law, 
they should be expected to offer an opportunity to simplify existing substantive 
law. 7° Comparative law's functional method ensures that when designing a 
transplant to be implanted in the foreign system, those orchestrating the trans-
plant rely upon endogenous legal rules, structures, and institutions in that re-
ceiving jurisdiction and consider how these endogenous elements will interact 
with the new rule. 71 In other words, after having first considered whether the 
basic function of DL T helps resolve a problem that the legal rule, institution, or 
structure struggles to adequately address in its current form, and after then con-
sidering which distributed ledger's mix of services best advances that functional 
goal, "the transplantation process [next] requires a consideration of any institu-
tions or elements of the receiving system, here the DLT, that serve some or all 
of the same function. Only then can the transplant, the crypto-legal structure, be 
successfully designed." 72 During that process, those designing the crypto-legal 
structure will identify areas in which DLT acts, or can be coded to act as, func-
tionally equivalent to legal rules. 73 In such circumstances, creating crypto-legal 
structures offers an opportunity to simplify substantive law. 74 
Second, those designing and implanting crypto-legal transplants should ex-
pect new legal elements and actors to emerge. 75 Comparative legal scholarship 
instructs that the very nature of a transplant is that "when those vested with au-
thority have decided what law to import, the process of adaptation to the local 
COMPARATIVE LAW 21-30 (2d ed. 1993)); and Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of 'Legal 
Transplants', 4 MAASlRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997). 
68. See Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 441, 443 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2006). 
69. See Reyes, supra note 6, at 415-37 (categorizing these ripple effects into three broad areas 
of legal system disruption: disruption of substantive law, disruption of legal structures, and disrup-
tion of legal culture). 
70. See id. at 416-21. 
71. See id. at 417 (arguing that the functional method of comparative law, and the systems 
analysis of computer science, encourages regulators and DLT computer coders alike to "first as-
sess[] a specific existing legal structure, identifying its fnnctional relation to society, breaking out 
subsystems of the legal structure, and identifying their functions, and then assessing which elements 
ofDLT, if any, endogenously fill those functions"). 
72. Id. at 416. 
73. Id. at 417. 
74. Id.; see also Carla L. Reyes, Blockchain-Based Agencies, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, 
Summer 2017, at 9, 10 ("Imagine, for example, simplifying the rules related to Article 9 UCC-1 
filing search errors or simplifying priority analysis."). 
75. Reyes, supra note 6, at 421. 
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environment will often add new and unexpected elements to the import." 76 Put 
another way, studies show that, historically, transplanted "laws have every-
where been adapted to suit local conditions, and transplants everywhere mani-
fest themselves as new hybrids." 77 In the context of crypto-legal structures, the 
result is simple: a legal rule implemented through computer code may not oper-
ate in the same manner as that same legal rule carried out by individuals. 78 In 
particular, the self-executing elements of the computer code and the software 
developers that code them might exert more regulatory power than intended, 
and may introduce new regulatory pitfalls, including unintended biases and 
questions of access to redress for faulty decisions. 79 
Third, using crypto-legal structures will disrupt choices in legal forms and, 
as a result, may lead to new patterns of enforcement and regulation. 80 Anthony 
Casey and Anthony Niblett argue that predictive technology will enable law-
makers to create "microdirectives" that allow individuals to understand their le-
gal rights and obligations in specific situations. 81 A microdirective would be 
created by technology first taking "a standard-like policy objective, analyz[ing] 
its application in all possible contexts, and creat[ing] a vast catalog of legal 
rules-each of which is tailored to best achieve the objective in a specific sce-
nario. "82 Then, as Casey and Niblett point out, "when a regulated actor is in any 
actual scenario, the technologies will search the vast catalog and identify the 
specific rules that are applicable ... [to] translate those rules into a simple mi-
crodirective on how the regulated actor can comply with the law." 83 Finally, the 
microdirective would be communicated to the regulated individual, 84 and the 
individual would decide whether to comply with the microdirective. 85 Crypto-
legal structures represent the potential for technology to eventually move be-
yond microdirectives to something more akin to automatic compliance. 86 If 
76. Graziadei, supra note 68, at 465; see also Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith 
in British Law or How UnifYing Law Ends Up in Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 12 (1998) 
(arguing that transplants must be understood instead as "legal irritants," the adoption of "which 
triggers a whole series of new and unexpected events"). 
77. WERNERMENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONlEXT 51 (2d ed. 2006). 
78. Reyes, supra note 6, at 422. 
79. Id. at 423-26. 
80. Id. at 428-32. 
81. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 
1401, 1403, 1410-12 (2017) (describing a "microdirective" as an easy-to-follow behavioral directive 
for legal compliance created by technology). 
82. Id. at 1412. 
83.Id. 
84.Id. 
85. Reyes, supra note 6, at 432 (citing Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving 
Laws, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 429, 439 (2016)). 
86. Id. at 424 ("In other words, cryptolaw would enable a world of microdirectives in which, 
instead of delivering a microdirective or range of microdirectives to an individual for choice of 
compliance, a range of microdirectives is derived, a choice is made, and the choice is executed, all 
by the crypto-regulatory agent that exists within the crypto-legal structure.") (citations omitted). 
Whether this outcome is desirable is one of the issues left for further exploration in the jurispruden-
tial space of cryptolaw for blockchains. 
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enough crypto-legal structures emerge, certain systems will automatically com-
ply with regulatory requirements. 87 In such circumstances, the choice left to in-
dividuals is whether to participate in a prima facie compliant system or to 
participate in an alternative, perhaps noncompliant system. 88 Such a possibility 
offers both promises and perils-the promise of allowing regulation to more 
closely mirror economic and social realities and the risk that a form of automatic 
restraint may significantly reduce individual autonomy. 89 
Fourth, crypto-legal structures may enable a reduction in law-lag. 90 Preva-
lent in the law and technology context, law-lag refers to the fact "that existing 
rules and institutional structures for rulemaking are becoming less capable of 
addressing the rapid pace of change."91 In considering functional equivalents, 
the discipline of comparative law often considers the differences between the 
law on the books and the law in action. The law on the books is the blackletter 
statement of the law, while the law in action is the law as it actually works in 
practice. 92 The gap between these two versions oflaw contributes significantly 
to the law-lag that perpetually plagues law and technology. 93 By transferring the 
law on the books into DL T-based computer code, crypto-legal structures trans-
form the law on the books to the law in action, thereby significantly reducing or 
eliminating the gap that feeds law-lag. 94 
Fifth, and finally, crypto-legal structures will be coded by software devel-
opers, which may shift the locus of legal culture away from lawyers and towards 
software developers. 95 Defined (by some)96 as the "attitudes, values, and opin-
ions held in society, with regard to law, the legal system and its various parts," 
legal culture "determines when, why, and where people use law, legal institu-
tions, or legal process; and when they use other institutions, or do nothing."97 
Scholars have described "the law in lawyers' heads" as a significant source of 
legal culture-the way lawyers practice law and their understanding of local 
rules and procedures impacts how the law on the books translates into law in 
action.98 If the crypto-legal structures begin to transform the law on the books 
87. Id. at 432-33 
88.Id. 
89. Id. at 433. 
90. Id. at 435-36. 
91. Wulf A. Kaai, Evolution of Law: Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics 
Framework, in FESTSCHRIFT ZU EHREN VON CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER [FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF 
CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER] 1211, 1212 (Wulf A. Kaai et al. eds., 2014). 
92. Reyes, supra note 6, at 435. 
93. See id. 
94.Id. 
95. Id. at 436-37. 
96. For a discussion of some of the other definitions used in the literature, see id. at 434-35. 
97. LAWRENCEM. FRIEDMAN, LAW AND SOCIETY 76 (1977). 
98. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1500-01 (1996); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 97, at 76, 79 (describing 
"internal legal culture" as the attitudes and values of professionals that work within the system); 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 4 (1990) 
(same). 
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into law enacted through computer code, the law in software developers' heads 
may impact legal culture more strongly than lawyers do. 99 This shift in the fac-
tors that impact legal culture, as with many of the other analytical results dis-
cussed here, offers both the promise of more uniform application of law and the 
peril of imbedding the biases of software developers into the law. 100 
The prevalence and relative importance of any of these five factors will 
vary with the use case to which the crypto-legal structure is applied. This is not 
a formula for constructing successful crypto-legal structures so much as it is a 
framework for beginning to analyze, discuss, and create a philosophy of law 
implemented through self-executing cryptographic computer code; it is a frame-
work for beginning to build a jurisprudence of cryptolaw for blockchain tech-
nology. 
III. DELAWARE AND BLOCKCHAIN-BASED 
CORPORATE SHARE ISSUANCE: A CASE STUDY 
To better understand how the cryptolaw framework might be applied in a 
specific circumstance, this article now turns to a case study: Delaware's efforts 
to allow corporations to issue shares using distributed ledger technology. This 
section first offers the background scenario that brought the share registry for-
ward as a potential case for implementing a crypto-legal structure. Then this 
section uses the principles of the cryptolaw framework to consider three poten-
tial legal ripple effects that may result: the need for further simplification of 
substantive law, the emergence of new actors requiring regulatory oversight, 
and a potential shift in corporate culture. 
A. Delaware's Existing Share Registry Systems Are Broken 
The saga of changing the Delaware General Corporation Law to enable 
DLT-based corporate share issuance began in May 2016 when Delaware's then 
Governor Jack Markell created the Delaware Blockchain Initiative. 101 The Gov-
ernor charged the Delaware Blockchain Initiative with, among other things, pur-
suing "the amendment of Delaware law to accommodate distributed ledger 
shares." 102 The move was welcomed by Delaware Chancery Court Vice Chan-
cellor J. Travis Laster, who, in a speech given to the Council of Institutional 
Investors just five months later, said that distributed ledger technology enables 
99. Reyes, supra note 6, at 436. 
100. Id. at 424-26. 
101. Marco A. Santori, Governor Jack Markell Announces Delaware Blockchain Initiative, 
GLOBAL DEL. BLOG (June 10, 2016), https://global.delaware.gov/2016/06/10/delaware-to-create-
distributed-ledger-based-share-ownership-structure-as-part -of-b lockchain-initiative/ [https ://web. ar 
chive.org/web/20180305210213/https://global.delaware.gov /2016/06/10/delaware-to-create-distrib 
uted-ledger-based-share-ownership-structure-as-part-of-blockchain-initiative/]. 
102. Id. 
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"a utopian vision of a share ownership system where there is only one type of 
owner: record owners." 103 
The vice chancellor later took the opportunity to underscore the practical 
importance of his position on distributed ledger technology's potential by offer-
ing commentary in a February 15, 2017 memorandum opinion In Re Dole Food 
Company, Inc. Stockholder Litigation. 104 Dole reached a settlement agreement 
with its former shareholders, who had sued alleging that the conflicting interests 
of key persons during a merger caused shareholders to receive a reduced price 
for their shares. 105 To distribute the settlement funds, the court and the parties 
needed to determine who owned shares that entitled them to an award. 106 As part 
of the claim process, "shareholders representing 49,164,415 shares claimed set-
tlement proceeds, but the class contained only 36,793,758 shares."107 The insti-
tutions charged with keeping track of who owns which shares, the Depository 
Trust Company (DTC), 108 could not confirm which claimants actually owned 
existing shares. 109 
Commenting on this troubling state of affairs, Vice Chancellor Laster ex-
plained in a footnote of the memorandum opinion in which he decided who 
would receive the settlement funds that 
[t]his problem is an unintended consequence of the top-down federal solution 
to the paperwork crisis that threatened Wall Street in the 1970s. Through the 
policy of share immobilization, Congress and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission addressed the crisis using the 1970s-era technologies of deposi-
tory institutions, jumbo paper certificates, and a centralized ledger. 110 
Noting that "[i]t was an incomplete solution" even at the time it was created, 
Laster explained the law lag only grew over time, compounding the problem. rn 
Laster further commented that "[d]istributed ledger technology offers a poten-
tial technological solution by maintaining multiple, current copies of a single 
and comprehensive stock ownership ledger." 112 Although the Delaware Block-
chain Initiative had been considering this very use case for nearly one year, the 
media attention given to the vice chancellor's comments in the Dole case 
103. Andrew Quentson, Take Back Stock and Share Voting with Blockchain Tech, Says 
Delaware Judge, CCN (Oct. 25, 2016, 10:09 PM), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/take-back-
stock-and-share-voting-with-blockchain-tech-says-delaware-judge/ [perma.cc/BL5J-KGJ G]. 
104. No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL 624843 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017). 
105. Id.; Steven Davidoff Solomon, Dole Case Illustrates Problems in Shareholder System, 
N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017 /03/21/business/dealbook/dole-case-
illustrates-problems-in-shareholder-system.html. 
106. See Solomon, supra note 105. 
107. Caytas, supra note 37. 
108. The DTC is a subsidiary of the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC). Id. 
109. Id. 
llO. In re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litigation, No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL 624843, at 
*4 n.l (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017) (citing In re Appraisal of Dell Inc. (Dell Ownership), No. 9322-
VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *3-7 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2015)). 
lll. See id. 
ll2. Id. (citing Santori, supra note 101). 
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seemed to spur action. 113 By April of2017, the Delaware Bar Association's Cor-
porate Law Council proposed modifications to the Delaware General Corpora -
tion Law that would allow distributed-ledger share issuance. 114 Just three 
months later, in July 2017, Delaware Governor John C. Camey Jr. signed the 
bill 115 that amended Section 219 and 224 of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law to permit corporations to use records on a distributed ledger as a stock 
ledger under certain circumstances. 116 
B. Delaware Is Enabling Crypto-Legal Structures and Should 
Expect Ripple Effects in Adjacent Areas of the Law 
The efforts to enable DL T-based corporate shares can be viewed as efforts 
to enable crypto-legal structures in the field of corporate law. A corporation al-
lows diffuse and large numbers of individuals, many of whom may not person-
ally know each other, to come together in the economically efficient pursuit of 
profit. 117 A corporate stock ledger functions to enable those diffuse and numer-
ous actors to quickly distinguish who is entitled to what amount of economic 
return on their investment. 118 In other words, corporate share registries allow 
mutually distrusting shareholders to reach agreement about the evolution and 
existence of the relative ownership claims between them. As the Dole case 
demonstrated, existing mechanisms for maintaining share registries failed to 
keep pace with the technology individuals used to trade ownership interests. 119 
113. JeffMordock, Delaware Betting Big on Blockchain, DELAWAREONLINE (Apr. 7, 2017, 
3 :34 PM), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/2017 /04/07 /delaware-betting-big-blockch 
ain/100162782/ [perma.cc/33L 7-BQWM]. 
114. Id. 
115. Rizzo, supra note 1. 
116. Newly Released Delaware Corporate Law Amendments Would Permit Blockchain 
Shares, COOLEY ALERT (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2017/2017-03-15-
newly-released-delaware-corporate-law-amendments-would-permit-blockchain-shares [https://perma. 
cc/LR6P-AHBA]; see also Lowell D. Ness & Valeria R. Bystrowicz-Liendo, Delaware Law 
Embraces Digital Securities, VIRTUAL CURRENCY REP. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.virtualcurren 
cyreport.com/2017 /08/delaware-law-embraces-digital-securities/ [http://perma.cc/Q4 XV-AMD4]. In 
particular, the ledger must: (a) be "convertible into clearly legible paper form within a reasonable 
time;" (b) "be used to prepare the list of stockholders specified in Section 219 as well as in Section 
220, dealing with stockholder demands to inspect the corporations books and records;" (c) be able 
to "record[] the information specified in Section 156 for consideration for partly paid shares, Section 
159 for the transfer of shares for collateral security, Section 217(a) for pledged shares, and Section 
218 for voting trusts;" and (d) be able to "record[] transfers of stock as governed by Article 8 of the 
Delaware Uniform Commercial Code." Id. 
117. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250 (1999) ("We argue that public corporation law can offer a second-
best solution to team production problems because it allows rational individuals who hope to profit 
from team production to overcome shirking and rent-seeking by opting into an internal governance 
structure we call the 'mediating hierarchy."') (citations omitted). 
118. See Ness & Bystrowicz-Liendo, supra note 116 (noting the purpose is to "know exactly 
who [the] true stockholders are at all times"). 
119. See In re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litigation, No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL 624843, 
at *4 n.l (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017). 
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As a result, the current structure routinely fails to enable shareholders to ade-
quately reach consensus about who owns which shares-making this an area 
ripe for creating a crypto-legal structure. 
Delaware's exercise in examining whether DLT-based corporate share is-
suance warranted changes to existing substantive law represents an example of 
the first ripple effect of crypto-legal structures at play: examining how the 
crypto-legal structure, in this case a distributed ledger share registry, will inter-
act with, and call for changes to, existing substantive law. The next step in the 
first factor's analysis is to ask whether and how corporate shares issued on a 
distributed ledger will interact with federal securities exchange rules, should a 
public company wish to use a distributed ledger share registry .120 For example, 
are there any conflicts with existing federal securities laws that regulate public 
companies that would prevent public companies from using digital shares? The 
answer to that question under current law may result in private companies being 
the primary adopters of distributed ledger share registries. In such a case, a fur-
ther opportunity to simplify existing substantive law may arise. If no such con-
flict, whether legal or practical, to public company adoption of DL T-share 
registries arises, then Professor George Geis argues that the substantive "legal 
implications of traceable shares will be profound." 121 In particular, Professor 
Geis argues that traceable shares could enable more responsive shareholder gov-
ernance models, impact the nature of shareholder lawsuits, and offer the oppor-
tunity to rethink the separation of corporate and shareholder liability. 122 Thus, 
whether obstacles to adoption arise or not, greater impact to corporate law be-
yond the changes already enacted to the Delaware General Corporation Law 
should be expected to materialize. 
In keeping with another ripple effect predicted by the cryptolaw framework, 
we might also expect new actors with regulatory-like power related to privately 
held digital shares to emerge. For example, the requirements for compliant 
DL T-based share registries created by the amendments to the Delaware General 
Coiporation Law include recording information that is not endogenously or rou-
tinely recorded by public blockchains like the Bitcoin Blockchain or 
Ethereum. 123 Rather, the capacity to routinely record such information into a 
DL T-based system will need to be developed, likely by a proprietary DL T -
solution provider such as Symbiont, which has already worked closely with Del-
aware in this and other initiatives. 124 The technology companies that create 
120. See Ness & Bystrowicz-Liendo, supra note 116 ("[N]one of the existing Stock Exchanges 
are currently set up to trade digital securities."). 
121. George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 
2018-2019) (manuscript at 5), ssm.com/abstract=3129042. 
122. See generally id. 
123. Newly Released Delaware Corporate Law Amendments Would Permit Blockchain 
Shares, supra note 116. 
124. See, e.g., Caitlin Long, Blockchain Crosses the Delaware: Smart Securities to Disrupt 
Corporate Finance, MARKETS MEDIA (July 31, 2017), https://matketsmedia.com/blockchain-
crosses-delaware/ [http://perma.cc/CH58-Q92K] (noting that "Symbiont and its legal team assisted 
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DL T-based share registries may thus retain a certain level of control over the 
data contained in the distributed ledger and, depending upon the technical de-
tails of the distributed ledger, over the chain of records themselves. 125 Such com-
panies will become the DL T equivalent of the DTCC. While the DTCC is not a 
regulatory body, but rather, is regulated by the SEC, 126 commentators have ar-
gued that "[i]n fact, the DTCC operates with minimal SEC oversight," and the 
DTCC has been treated in various ways as though it is a govermnent entity. 127 
As evidenced by the Dole case, the accumulation of such soft power can have 
important and unexpected effects on the corporate legal system. Delaware reg-
ulators should be prepared to exercise oversight over the companies that pro-
vided DLT-based systems to companies for use as share registries. Similarly, 
companies that develop such systems should prepare for a new level of potential 
regulation over the software they provide, particularly if they use a software as 
a service model and remain involved in the actual delivery and functioning of 
the system. 
If startups adopt DL T-based share registries at the outset, and if doing so 
makes it more difficult for such companies to be traded publicly, then Dela-
ware's DLT-based share recording system may inadvertently set the stage for 
fewer publicly traded companies and more unicorns. 128 As Abbey Stemler sug-
gests: "Unicorns are able to avoid regulation and dictate the rules that will gov-
ern them in traditional and nontraditional ways." 129 Ultimately, it is important 
to note that in "a global economy that can be digitally wired and connected, 
massive potential exists for new business models and consumer experiences to 
disrupt industrial-era structures and institutions that have existing regulatory 
in crafting" the blockchain-related amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law and that 
the full benefit of the amendments will not manifest until "the Delaware Division of Corporations 
announces completion of its integration with Symbiont's blockchain"). 
125. Adam Krellenstein, Blockchain Technology and Institutional Finance, SYMBIONT (Aug. 
2, 2017), https://symbiont.io/blog/2017 /8/2/blockchain-technology-and-institutional-finance [https: 
//perma.cc/FWY2-4VUU] ("Note that so-called 'permissioned blockchains' (such as the one Sym-
biont is building) are networks in which the identities of all the participants are known to each 
other."); Explainer: Permissioned Blockchains, MONAX, https://monax.io/explainers/permission 
ed_blockchains/ [http://perma.cc/K2S2-AK9Y] ("Permissioned blockchain networks allow the net-
work to appoint a group of participants in the network who are given the express authority to provide 
the validation of blocks of transactions. Or, to participate in the consensus mechanism."). 
126. Alexis Brown Stokes, In Pursuit of the Naked Short, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 1, 6 (2009). 
127. John W. Welborn, The 'Phantom Shares' Menace, REGULATION, Spring 2008, at 52, 54. 
128. Abbey Stemler, The Myth of the Sharing Economy and Its Implications for Regulating 
Innovation, 67 EMORY L.J. 197, 199 n.11 (2017) ("A 'unicorn' is a startup company valued at over a 
billion dollars.") (citing Words We 're Watching: The Billion-Dollar Unicorn, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/unicorn-words-we're-watching). 
129. Id. at 231. 
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frameworks." 130 Many start-ups are already on such paths of regulatory entre-
preneurship.131 Arguably, such power to engage and change the regulatory struc-
tures that would otherwise apply to a proposed business model has had a 
negative effect on corporate culture. 132 In particular, when private companies 
grow to such a scale that previously anticipated a public offering, but no longer 
face the same regulatory and market pressures to do so, a separation of owner-
ship and control that mirrors the situation in public companies emerges, but is 
subject to none of the same governance oversight. 133 If DL T-based share regis-
tries are widely adopted, and adjacent areas of substantive legal or infrastructure 
conflicts, or both, are not resolved, Delaware's adoption of D LT -based share 
registries may lead to magnification of the shift in corporate culture that is al-
ready underway. 
IV. THE NEXT WA VE OF 
CORPORA TE LEGAL QUESTIONS 
FOR CRYPTOLA W 
The changes to the Delaware General Corporation Law go a long way to 
showing mainstream companies the potential value of distributed ledger tech-
nologies for their purposes. However, by engaging in a discourse around DL T-
based share registries rooted in the cryptolaw framework, this article makes 
clear that we should not expect the changes made to the Delaware General Cor-
poration Law to be the only changes resulting from the adoption of DL T for 
c01porate share registries. Instead, we should expect ripple effects to manifest 
in adjacent areas of law and regulation for some time to come. More than that, 
we should begin discussing the implications of those ripple effects for corporate 
law and policy-that is what cryptolaw for DL T is all about. 
In the meantime, a significant amount of economic activity is taking place 
through businesses that engage DLT in an entirely different way-namely, busi-
nesses built on top of a blockchain and conducting operations through computer 
code. Some such businesses are quasi and fully autonomous. Such businesses 
take the type of legal questions that Delaware asked during the process of ena-
bling DL T-based stock ledgers and multiplies them tenfold. Even as the cryp-
tolaw discussion should not prematurely conclude with regard to Delaware 
digital stock ledgers, the next wave of corporate legal questions for cryptolaw 
130. Elizabeth Pollman, The Rise of Regulatory Affairs in Innovative Startups, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ENlREPRENEURSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (D. Gordon Smith & 
Christine Hurt eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4), https://ssm.com/abstract=2880818. 
131. See generally Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 
S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 384-385 (2017). 
132. Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 165-
167 (2017), https://www.pennlawreview.com/online/166-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-165.pdf (describing 
Uber' s recent scandals as symptoms of deeper problems with the company's corporate culture). 
133. Id. at 168-169 ("[R]ecent market trends and deregulatory reforms have weakened or 
eliminated the principal mechanisms that imposed discipline on start-up company founders."). 
SPRING 2018 301 
Reyes 
are already manifesting. 134 Such new questions call equally upon regulators, 
policy makers, practitioners, business executives, early stage entrepreneurs and 
legal academics to engage in the discourse of cryptolaw to anticipate the poten-
tial challenges, implications, and consequences of moving legal and regulated 
economic activity to distributed ledger technology and blockchain technology-
based systems. 
134. I begin exploring some of these new questions in Carla L. Reyes, If Rockefeller Were a 
Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssm.com/abstract=3082915. 
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